Security Before Democracy?

Ljubomir Frčkoski

Abstract. Perhaps one of the clearest conclusions made by transition analysts dealing with the theory of the transition to democracy in the communist countries is that security issues are shown to be priority for control and stabilization in the transition process, particularly in its initial establishment stages. This parameter is driven further, by these sources and their claim that security issues in their internal and external aspects (inter-ethnic relations and minority issues, relations with neighboring countries, etc.) have even higher priority meanings from the basic ideological stands of transition such as: democracy and human rights. Why is it so? To what extent does our experience confirm this viewpoint? And finally, what are the risks of blindly considering only the delivery of security, in terms of building democracy and the rule of law in those countries?.

1. Introduction

My opinion is that our experience of a transition of twenty years, unequivocally supports this conclusion as such. Unfortunately, also in terms of appropriate sacrificing democracy in favor of a populist authoritarian system that has managed to build in Macedonia (since 2008) because of the blind consideration and obsessive interest of foreigners only for security arrangements that Macedonia can and should deliver. The first conclusion is supported at two important points: security is primarily important because states arising after the

dissolution of other major, complex states, in the logic of the basic principle of self-preservation and self-help, in the anarchic relations of the international community have predominant "instinct" to consolidate and address security challenges and arrangements of their own existence. Such a degree of coherence of internal resources and diplomatic means and connections suppresses into the background some of the important ideological schemes of internal political relations and the building of democracy. It certainly does not mean that this will necessarily develop into authoritarian political forms (later this is exactly what had happened), but it only means that the democratic program and institutions will suffer "pressure" from other priorities and will probably be placed under the imperative of efficient, quickly responding to possible external challenges. Second, in Macedonia the issues of self-preservation and security of the state were also stressed because of some important domestic political reasons, among which the most important were inter-ethnic relations and the general system of addressing individual human rights with individual and group rights of ethnic communities that are not majority. Especially the way to set up and protect the "right" of cultural diversity. In a word, the functioning of liberal democracy in a multi-ethnic and multicultural society such as Macedonian.

Several facts are very important in the field of external factors in depiction of pushing and inhibiting the security paradigm in the Macedonian society.[1] Almost a stressful feeling of inhibited fear and danger: from the Serbian megalomaniac militaristic hysteria (1989-1992); from the possible pan-Albanian (now without the control of the army of federal Yugoslavia) idea and project; from the Bulgarian national frustration with the Macedonian identity; and finally, from the Greek arrogance and its blinded policy toward us (1991-1994).

The security paradox for Macedonia was that as a new state it could not defend itself from such aggressive neighbors by closing itself and relying on its military, police and intelligence potentials, but only by

---

[1] Macedonia's road to independence was very "procedural": First ever democratic and multiparty elections in 1990; Declaration of Independence; Independence Referendum; the 1991 new Constitution confirmed by the so-called Badinter Commission; political "mastership" in negotiating a peaceful withdrawal of the then federal Yugoslav army (JNA).

a radical opening towards the international community and the military potential of serious Western countries like the USA (NATO), whose presence in Macedonian territory and in the region neutralizes the military potential and superiority of the neighboring countries. The Macedonian political leadership of that time well perceived that fact and pursued a policy for opening of the country, a policy completely opposite from the one pursued by most of the neighbors at the time. However, the internal political effect in the short term of such openness of the country was the instant boosting of the feeling of vulnerability and being unprotected among the population. It cannot directly and easily be seen that the instinct of isolating oneself when in danger should be replaced with the opposite: a radical opening when under threat. Moreover, at that time there was no open offer for the presence of foreign troops (US, NATO) in our territory, but only verbal support and assistance from friendly countries. It only increased the security frustration of the population. What is very important and also hard to understand by foreign security experts is: why in such circumstances the reactions of the population were not a hysterical conflict on interethnic basis or political instability followed by conflict of that kind, but the opposite, a subtle coherence, being aligned around the basic political ideas for the development of democracy, system institutions, and political leadership (which was then symbolized by Kiro Gligorov and a young group of politicians around him previously engaged at the university), demonstrating referential stability and elasticity in resolving conflict situations? Such an unraveling of the security frustration and uncertainty in Macedonia was due to several factors. First is the different political history and experience of interethnic relations and the struggle for survival of the Macedonian people, respectively. In Macedonia there have never been ethnic wars of serious proportions and negative collective memory that would be perceived through "the graveyards and blood revenge" between ethnic communities. Even in times of tensions, different local communities learned to live with each other. [2]

The majority minority (minorities) relationship has had a capacity for tolerance. In the context of inter-ethnic relations that are signifi cantly

---

[2] This is shown in almost all documents or state-making projects of the historical VMRO.

infl uenced by mutual prejudices and stereotypes, it is important to distinguish between the following (the difference in the political experience of Macedonia is based on this): between the very existence of ethnic and religious prejudices and stereotypes on one side, and willingness to base social confl iction on them. Namely, when they are the main driving force for the inter-ethnic confl icting correlations. If the inter-ethnic "stereotype" is defi ned as: a set of attitudes and beliefs about the personal characteristics of the person or group of people from other ethnic, racial, religious or gender affi liation that are often negative or inferior qualifi cations for "others" and are the result of the need for classifi cation, simplifi ed views, half-truths. They, incidentally, speak more about those making such stereotypes than about those for whom they are intended, then it is important to distinguish the existence of stereotypes or even demonization of the other on one hand, from a situation of "active stereotype" or behavior, political and social action that is motivated on basis on such stereotype, on the other hand. For example, the Macedonians have approximately the same stereotypes and distrust of fellow Muslims, especially of the Albanians, as the Bulgarians have distrust of the Turks as a minority in Bulgaria, the Serbs for the Albanians of Kosovo or the Greeks for the local Turks in Greece. That ethnic distance varies in all these cases with lack of confi dence from 60 to 68%. However, when respondents were asked the question (involving active prejudice) whether they would become politically activated based on this prejudice, mistrust and distance, members of different nations differently answered or gave even dramatically different answers: even 48% of the Serbs said YES, and so on. The Macedonians showed a drastic decline in that possible engagement based on prejudice with only 12% of respondents saying YES. The latter shows the extent of the actual confliction in a society. In this case, even if they have similar stereotypes and prejudices about Muslims, the Macedonians still show great inertia, caution, and slowness in motivating social action towards "others" based on stereotypes about them. A cynical assessment would claim that the Macedonians are inclined to have the government solve every problem including the aforementioned rather then take own individual responsibility; but, in the context of that gap, a small but important difference, one can rest the whole different experience of

more tolerant inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia and even toward the other, neighboring countries. Second, there is considerable difference in cultural notions of the local ethnic communities in the country (the Macedonian, the Albanian, respectively) than those in the neighborhood. The Albanians in Macedonia are economically better situated and have a more developed political culture and a smoother relationship with the Macedonians than other groups of the Albanians living in Kosovo or Albania have (with the Serbs or among themselves). On the other hand, the Macedonian people, as a relatively small Slavic nation, developed properties of cohabitation and cultural survival and existence, which is specifically reflected in the position of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Although one of the oldest, it is still unrecognized by the family of Orthodox Churches, which creates a special instinct for survival by making alliances with the Vatican (closer relations than those with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople, or with the neighboring churches). Its position forces it to make complex political maneuvers and learn of political compromise and cohabitation. Because of this (and it is important for the culture of the Orthodox population) liberal values and democratic institutions that come from Western countries after the fall of communism, relatively easily become rooted in Macedonia than in other "Orthodox countries". Third, there was something I call "a balance of fear about Macedonia" in the region. The overburdened history of conflicts and wars in the Balkans is related to Macedonia and the geopolitical space of Macedonia. It was part of the history of each of the neighboring countries as well. This created restraint from easily reaching for renewed destabilization of Macedonia. Such typical Macedonian "discourse of Balkan crossroads", or of "a Balkan cross-land country" in this case was realized through non-intervention and balance in stability of Macedonia (and the region as such). The result of the conjuncture of the aforementioned cultural/political factors and geopolitical elements enabled overcoming the inhibitory fear as expressed by the population in Macedonia for their own safety and that of the new state. Finally, crossing into an entirely new phase of consolidation and stabilization of the country. Modern challenges to the stability of the state and refraction of all that in the "sense of security" among citizens, consist of the following situations: the

intervention of the international community in Kosovo and FRY and the repercussions of "the Albanian question" on Macedonia after the Kosovo crisis; the process of opening of the Macedonian economy and strategic privatizations, which has been refracted around the issue of aggressive Greek economic presence in the country (anti-Greek sentiment is much higher today than during the "Greek blockades" imposed on us?); the general rise in social insecurity and especially various crimes in the classical sense of security in life.

In my opinion, the first question is most neuralgic and mostly contributes to the "feeling of insecurity", which has general, hazy acute form but represents a constant threat. It consists of a string of conclusions, which have sometimes rather simplified form, but are very strong as widely accepted stereotypes: the international military intervention has "upset the balance" in favor of the Albanians in the region, by eliminating the "Serbian control" over Kosovo. For the local Macedonian population this creates uncertainty about the future conduct of the Albanians in the region and especially about the intensity of their "demands" to be delivered to the Macedonian state. That suppressed fear and anxiety actually gave rise to NATO skepticism in some political parties and political circles.

This feeling was further promoted by the inability of the then Macedonian government to "control" duly its relationship with the NATO partners during the refugee crisis and their legal status in Macedonia. The picture about the complete paralysis in relation to the demands of the Albanian "partner" in the then ruling government coalition –the DPA party and its freedom of action–. The entirety of such "feeling of uncertainty" was intensified among the ordinary people by their view that the Macedonian government "did not govern", but they were supposedly left to the accidental concatenation of circumstances ("fortunately, no one acutely is threatening us") while some (the Albanians in general, as prevalent stereotype) constantly "were undermining the system" and pushing their national interests and agendas before the very eyes of the blocked and corrupt government. This would be a very dangerous mood if it takes epidemic proportions because it acts (degradingly) in anomic manner upon the cohesion and motivating forces within society. It also spreads fear and uncertainty for the very future of the country and personal destinies of people which is the basis for every authoritarian

158

and populist manipulation. In Macedonia, as well as probably in every multicultural society, every politics must be careful as to "how it looks", how a political action and made compromise are perceived and accepted in the context of various sensitive ethnic stereotypes. Regardless if such pictures are real or not, they still are a political fact that in the worst case can push the joke and rationality too far, never to return. Cultural identities of individual ethnic segments are in a higher stage of sensitivity when they are daily confronted with the "other" cultures and practices in the same society. They feel their uniqueness in sharper way and so emphasize and defend it in a more forceful manner. There is stronger political motivation and mobilization in such situations of cultural plurality. State guarantee for the protection of cultural practices from hegemony of other local cultures is especially important in this context. It must be foreseen and then provided by the political decision-makers.

The consensus in such societies of a radical cultural segmentation is not a condition/basis (value) to be used as a point of departure in the construction of society - but a method, willingness and capacity to continuously and constantly deal with cultural clashes and competitiveness. Consensus is so transformed from (self-)value - into the procedural capacity/method to resolve conflicts. From given, it becomes assigned! We can also call it a minimum procedural consensus under constant construction.

I think the suppressed basis for the specified fear is the still unsubdued, unraised to level of awareness and acceptance, security paradox. Namely, we still do not see clearly the very reason for our relative stability: in our fragility, resilience, dynamism, and tolerance. These are values that have been "diagnosed" but not yet internalized or accepted in our political culture. Still, when mentioning the word "security", our first association implies the very state, army, police, borders, the Albanians, etc., as hegemonic cultural supremacy, that guards the tribal "fire". Regardless of our experience, we have not accepted the thesis to build our stability as a system of tolerance and openness of society. Therefore, we still have "stress" in the face of contact with the "others" without such security guarantee from the state hegemon. Such stress is emphasized in circumstances of existence of other social crises as well. We are not ready, at least not to the very end, to accept the state of constant fragility and resilience

and constantly redefining the consensus and balance (so important for multicultural societies) as our stability. We must constantly defuse the different levels of social confliction through dynamic inclusion or the involvement of social actors in the hubs that "cook" social consensus. A condition for success in this delicate project, which is new even for established democracies, is the effective functioning of a small but strong central state administration. It must ensure the neutrality of rules and procedures for the contacts among the great variety of cultural actors. It should provide "the market" and rules of peaceful interaction. Its role must be as neutral as possible, but extremely effective.

Such a function of the central administration relaxes the suppressed aggression and fear of endangering one's own cultural identity.

2. Macedonian biopolitics

Contrary to the potentials for emancipation, the situation in which Macedonia embarked upon last 10 years of transition is devolution. It is a sharp turn back toward dictatorship, of the kind of authoritarian populism. This means a dictatorship which uses the election facade for hiding and an operation of the system that is basically based on autocracy of party oligarchy, with the abolition of rule law. Why and how could this happen, is the daily question we ask ourselves. How to leave that authoritarian turn and go on to win again the freedom and constitutional democracy, is a difficult question that follows. This situation in Macedonia has been outrageously tolerated by our international friends who are obsessed with "security paradigm" (security-before-democracy, rather than security –through– democracy). For them it is crucial that in Macedonia there is multi-ethnic coalition government which, regardless how it is made up and what motives it uses to function, delivers superficial peace while the rest is a matter of secondary interest. The issues of democracy, human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law are hopelessly left to us, the Macedonian citizens (whatever that means) and to our experience in fighting for them and our constitutional democracy. The international community can be expected to show reaction only if we put it in a position to have to react because of our strategy of fight. It will not

cause the changes by itself, which summarized means that in Macedonia things will get worse before possibly becoming better! Hence, in this framework, I will expose the conclusions about the nature of the regime and the foundations for fighting it, in order to restore freedom and constitutional democracy!. The Macedonian variant of authoritarian populism has been constituted by creating and strengthening a party that has pretensions to represent itself as an essential expression of the Macedonian people, who are under siege, under threat from outside and from within. The VMRO-DPMNE party has turned into a "defensive formation" of the endangered people and asks the people at elections to give the party a legitimacy to define and administer the behavior in the country beyond and above the constitutional limitations of government in a democracy under the 1991 Constitution. By means of violent elections 90, the party has succeeded in obtaining such a mandate for the fourth consecutive time. The main tool for this operation for usurpation of power is constant promotion and building ideology about political construct of the organic unity of the people, rather than political and ideological pluralism in democracy. The sovereign, in our case the Party, has abolished all other political antagonisms, all political struggles; the Party has abolished politics as antagonization to the conflict of interests and ideologies through procedures of a representative and deliberative democracy and has declared only one meta-fight with the enemies of Macedonia. It is organized into phantasm of a homogeneous organic-developed political space directed to the outside in context of the neighboring countries "that want us to disappear" and inwards in context of the domestic traitors and fifth columnists who try to weaken us by their imposed and imported liberal ideas about freedom and rights. The very usurper of democracy, the DPMNE party leader, is not a leader in the true sense of the word that Lacan and Žižek call master-signifier, one that defines things with an act, on the contrary this party leader is a servant of the essential organic 90 In context of the gross affair of mass wiretapping illegally conducted by the present populist regime that was revealed in January and February 2015 (involving more than 20000 wiretapped individuals), one can also see evident election fraud on part of the present populist government and the ruling party, by using forged identity cards for the 2011 general elections; hence,

the legitimacy of the present government since then has been seriously challenged, but it remains in Macedonian power). He serves the organic unity of the people and protects them from internal and external conspiracies. From there he draws power that abolishes democracy and pluralism ,violates individual human rights, and abolishes the independent institutions of the system. In fact, he abolishes the political element, his authentic plurality of antagonistic interests, by replacing it with a superfight, a meta-contradiction, super- war by the Macedonian against the eternal and hideous enemies inside and outside. It certainly ends in farce with the Macedonian being in conflict with himself. So actually there is militarization of politics, in which every individual right may be sacrificed at any moment on the altar of the motherland, for the sake of imaginary organic unity and prosperity of the nation. Total master and total policy are possible only in this space of meta-politics with a single meta-fight. It is known from the literature as "political aesthetics" that is done by fascism: the establishment of new organic order, which abolishes modern individuality. The consequence is that our civism is abolished, prohibited, and we are merely reduced to homo-sacer (G. Agamben), capable of living bare life. We are people who are deprived of their civil rights and forced into life, which is not actually human, but only seems to be so. We are the only a fertile soil for the nation, which is a source of unlimited power of the Party that is actually reduced to the leader himself. It establishes our Schmittean sovereignty, a constant political crisis and constant emergency. The definition of emergency, determined by the sovereign, is that the law is abolished and reduced to managing the chaos, the space arising from/in its disappearance. In authoritarian populism there is no law (regulations based on the tenets and principles that are permanent and unchangeable, such as human rights, freedom, division of power, justice, etc.), but everything is administered by voluntaristic interpretation and changing laws by the administration or by the Party that has occupied it. So, paradoxically the decor of the "legal order" is maintained through the suspension of this order. In such a situation, that everyone in Macedonia witnesses, through a series of examples (in context of the current position of the Constitutional Court, the entire judicial system, the parliament and separation of power, the independence of the media etc.), everything is possible and

everything is prohibited. Nothing is predictable, except that everything will be finally decided by the sovereign, i.e., the Party. One should pay attention to a special feature in the chaos that is administered by the dictatorship, and it is the explosion of irrational violence and hatred. They become present in a form that Žižek calls "id-evil": dysfunctional cruelty, irrational violence for banal disputes, hatred of the "other" that has no reason, nor is caused by anything. It is about evil and violence, which consist of the most basic unsublimated phantasms about pleasure in the whole of the nation, which are impaired pursuant to the rhetoric of the dictatorship; a dictatorship that by stimulating such evil and violence to go into the streets and our homes, then administers them, thus establishing and maintaining hegemony in politics (Ernesto Laclau). That is the definition of condition that practically and theoretically is called dictatorship based on bio-political division in the life of the citizens and its reduction to a mere bare life, deprived from all rights that belong to it and from the dignity of the citizens. It is the Macedonian state converted into a concentration camp and the Macedonian citizen as homo sacer in it. Potentially, we are left alone with our people. We cannot change people, but we can try to destroy the instruments of usurpation and manipulation. Start of such revolutionary free-shooting change is offered, for example, by Alain Badiou and Giorgio Agamben, with a thesis on inoperativity between law and institutions. I would add, also, by connecting the islands of autonomy into a land of the newly conquered freedom. But it implies the struggle by the Macedonians citizens in the time left to them.

Authoritarian populism in Macedonia is accelerated film and danger of complete deformation directed against young democratic institutions in the beginning of their establishment. Fifteen years of transition to liberal democracy based on the 1991 Constitution was to be a fragile liberal experiment imposed from above, by the liberal elite, before the gust of unlimited domination of populism happened in 2008 and afterwards. Several shared themes between this populism of ours and the one in Europe: immigration, minorities ("resistance to the other"), nationalism, anti-Europe sentiment and the like - are not sufficient reason not to see the big picture of the substantial difference and different strength of each of them separately, to threaten the institutions of democracy in their own countries. Well known are the

foundations on which the authoritarian populism in Macedonia stands:

–Our illiberal social tradition burdened by communism and one party culture of statism, often connected with nationalism, and bad history toward minorities and ethnoreligious diversity (the Macedonians in former Yugoslavia often played the role of "being bigger Catholics, than the Pope himself" and were especially rigid toward the Albanians and liberal tendencies in the Yugoslav Communist Party).

–The coming to power of an extremely irresponsible political elite, which takes the easy way to political mobilization in line of ethnic homogenization (syndrome of riding the tiger instead civism). This involves manipulation of fear and conspiracy, historical mythologies aimed at finding concrete imaginary enemy in the form of other ethnic groups.

–Permanent economic crisis, corruption, and collective culture of letting everything go into the hands of the government, which should decide for us.

–Economic markets deformed by the penetration of the ruling party and the state, corruption and the absence of any foreseeable legal certainty and lack of entrepreneurial culture and initiative.

–Cynicism of the ruling elites to democratic values and especially to human rights. There is bizarre practice to increase, and not to reduce this cynicism in context of EU accession process. Furthermore, there is evolving practice of creating a dual reality in Macedonia and cheating in the process of adopting EU legislation. In that context, we see its skillful exploitation in getting time and space, while in practice the government is busy building a closed system of authoritarian populism (perverted anti-European Europeanism).

–Breaking the civil sector by organized state intrusion into it and transferring the ideological debate of authoritarianism inside it, to meet the need for disclosure of internal "traitors". The new-age dictators, which includes the Macedonian one, quickly learned that civil society is important for the support of

populism and smashing the opposition and so developed a system of duplication, or counteracting. It is delivered through a system of creating quangos, quasi nongovernmental organizations covering "the original civic NGOs" by counter actions for supporting the government and competing at calls for foreign donations. This system operates even on social networks in form of duplication of government policy of ethnic hatred, spreading hate speech, an alter ego of the government's political correctness with the partner DUI in power. It's the hidden, but in fact the actual language of the government's phalanx, by which every member of the ruling DPMNE party identifies himself. It is a secret code of winking among the party supporters by saying: we have to do like that in the government, but truly we are right here on the networks.

–Obsession with the media because of conceived policies of populism. In the populist context, media become a constituent part of the organization of power, not only its instrument (Giorgio Agamben).

Macedonian authoritarian populism, like populism in wider context, does not involve the concept of coherent policies, but it is eclectic. It is more like a bag that collects imagined policies mostly from the left on the political scene because of the economic misery and political culture of the population. In this assemblage of plastered policies and views, the connecting cord and ideological dogma is the thesis that the populist leader is close to his people. That is the key and connective tissue of the different political operations to be able to put them into a program and look coherently.

The second part of this political dogma is also known: anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism or claims that elites have buried themselves in trenches and are corrupt and do not listen to the voice of the people. But in this respect, today's Macedonian authoritarian populism is shrewder than its historical predecessors. It does not offer direct resistance to the pressure to which it is necessarily exposed by the EU and NATO policies, but on the contrary it is extremely polite and submissive to the requirements of the EU, and fully procedural. Thus this populism does now allow the opposition to make easy attacks, especially the Macedonian social democracy, which is

165

procedural in the history of its creation. In this its new strategy of adapting and buying time and space for establishing dictatorship, the Macedonian populism develops a so-called undemocratic proceduralism, authoritarian or empty proceduralism. It is a new feature that shows to be especially obscene and powerful in ideological terms. In the new dictatorships, everything is in accordance with the law, and the law is in accordance with them. Authoritarian legalism opposes the legitimacy of the Constitution and the previous liberal political system. This objective is achieved so that procedures and laws are made by two combined techniques. The first is the enormous production of laws, muddled legislation, legal fog that is often internally contradictory, which is, in fact, the intention of the very legislator. In such a situation of general uncertainty and insecurity, the instrument of application and interpretation of laws is entirely in the hands of the administration and the very government. Thus, the presumption of innocence and honesty of citizens disappears. Everyone is potentially guilty because he probably violates some law somewhere, but is not yet processed and depends on the mercy of the administration when will be done. A classic Kafkian situation. The second technique is ambiguity of the key legislation. What is legal and what is offense is rather ambiguous and with time changes are made in this context. Again the fundamental demiurge of implementation is the government and the administration. Their power is constantly growing and remains completely unchecked.

The ability of the leaders of this authoritarianism to draw money from European funds for legislative projects, and thereby maintain the same or even intensify their authoritarian power, makes them cynical toward European values while openly calling for the legitimacy of their political program as Eurosceptic or even anti-European. The result that we have on the ground of these authoritarian operations is creating a dual reality: the existence of a legal haze of pro-European formal legislation, which is to be shown to the foreigners, along with the existence of the entire universe of sub-rules that are actually important and serve to solve the life problems of citizens (the very biting reality). These sub-rules say who is the boss, where in the ruling party one should report to fi x a problem and how to interpret the formal legislation to the foreigners. However, the basic litmus

feature of such authoritarian populism, by which one can undoubtedly recognize and distinguish it, is the very attack on the independent institutions of constitutionalism and especially the Constitution. Here it is lethally consistent and efficient. He creates mirror room or echo room, while at the same time fully destroying the independence of other government and state institutions and thus making them movable mirrors that portray the image of an authoritarian leader. The outcome is complete arbitrariness of decisions and procedures of such institutions, a completely executed reality of the dictatorship. Special devastating attack is carried out (in case of Macedonia, finalized) on the judiciary. It is completely unqualified and highly partisan. It is to be noted here that, not by chance, the Constitutional Court is a special target of such devastation. The third clear or even major difference between the historical antecedents and the current authoritarian populism is the great obsession with the media outlets. The policies are simulacrum-like, imagined. Such policies ultimately depend on their grandiose and constant display to the public through the media; they do not depend on their level of accomplishment. Hence the media are key to this policy and its power. For such authoritarian politics and policy, media outlets (according to G. Agamben) are not just an instrument of power, but a constitutive pillar through which power and authority are executed. Without them, the power of the authoritarian populism rapidly erodes. Consequently, such authoritarian systems are obsessed and aimed at making control and pressure on the freedom of all possible media outlets. No compromise whatsoever! Fourthly, such authoritarian populism does not believe in elections as such. Although it seems obsessed with them and all public political life has been transformed into perpetual election campaign (election paradox), still it treats them as an unavoidable residue of democracy and pluralism, jeopardizing the phantasm of homogeneity of the newly constituted people. The authoritarian populist believes only in verification of himself and his policies through elections; he would not believe in any other result. Especially not in the pluralism of options and alternatives. Therefore, he finds it rather easy to make abuse of the police for election purposes, abuse of electoral rolls, corruption and blackmail of the administration for elections (by blackmailing the administration employees under short-term working contract) involving also other electoral underworld. In

167

order to achieve success, the authoritarian populist executes the following dangerous operation: he occupies the public space and fully contaminates it with partisan and abrasive speech, creating a permanent division of the citizens (and when it is not necessary) along party lines, which become "bloodthirsty". Thus, the public space is full of "adrenaline" in constant conflict mode which the populist regime channels and controls. In this context, basic tool used by this populist regime is the classic operation of producing enemies, threats, conspiracy, and division of the citizens: those who are traitors, foreign agents, spies, infidels, fifth columnists, commies, reds, and those who are patriots and love their current government and country at the same time. In context of the aforementioned, the conceptualization of populism would include: constructing "its own people" and appealing to them; anti-institutional rhetoric and antagonism (political, not a post-political); and rhetoric of direct democracy, mediated by special "redemptive" leadership.

3. Conclusions

Macedonian authoritarian populism is dangerous because of its ability for internalization of crime and repression (human security rather than democracy and freedom) as values of the zombified individual/zombified masses. Thus Macedonian populism provides its "own people" and its own reproduction. The first result of this trend is the very dissatisfaction as shown by "these people" and their abandoning European values, things that are clearly shown by opinion polls and elections. This creates absurd; actually it closes the vicious circle of the absurd: there exists the populist regime and the perversion that it has created. There is no credible democratic alternative. Autocrats of this type in the Western Balkans, especially in Macedonia, in this regard manage to sell their politics surprisingly well to the Eurocrats, working together on the enlargement policy of the EU? They seem to have discovered the famous G-spot of the EU policy in the Balkan region: security before democracy! The result is stabilocracy which they offer the Eurocrats in exchange for EU tolerance for human rights violations and the destruction of the rule of law!.

Bibliographic references

- Agamber, Giorgio (2000), *Homo Sacer*. Zagreb: Arkzin.

- Agamber, Giorgio *Medias*, www.youtube.com.

- Ahmed, Sara (2004), *The Cultural Politics of Emotions*. Edinburg: Anchor Books.

- Albertazzi, Daniele & Duncan McDonnell (ed.) (2008), *Twenty First Century Populism*. New York: Palgrave.

- Arditi, Benjamin (2007), *Politics on the Edges of Liberalism: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

- Badiou, Alain (2002), *Highly Speculative Reasoning on the Concept of Democracy*, The Symptom 2, www.lacan.com.

- Badiou, Alain (2005), *It is a Right to Rebel against Reactionaries*, (available at: *https://muse.jhu.edu/article/190192*).

- Bauman, Zygmunt (1995), *Life in Fragments.* Oxford: Blackwell.

- Betz Hans-Georg, Radical Right-Wing Populism (1994), *The New Politics of the Right*, New York: Palgrave.

- Bowman, Glenn W. (2005), "Constitutive Violence and the Nationalist Imaginary: Antagonism and Defensive Solidarity in 'Palestine' and 'Former Yugoslavia'", in Panizza, Francisco (ed.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*. London: Verso, 118-143.

- Canovan, Margaret (1999), "Trust The People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy", *Political Studies*, vol. XLVII, London.

- Caputo J.D. (1997), *Religion Without Religion*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Derrida, Jacques (1982), "Sending on Representation", *Social Research*, vol. 49, no. 2.

- Derrida, Jacques (1996), *Archive Fever, A Freudian Impression*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

- Foucalt, Michael (2001), Dits et Ecrits, 1954-1981. Paris: Gallimard.

- Foucault, Michael (2001), L'herméneutique de Sujet, Course au Collège de France 1981-1988. Paris: Gallimard.

• Hall, Stuart (1988), *The hard road to renewal : Thatcherism and the crisis of the left*. London: Verso.

• Hayward, Jack (1996), "The Populist Challenge to Elitist Democracy in Europe" (ed. Elitism Populism, and European Politics). Oxford.

• Held, Joseph (ed.) (1996), *Populism in Eastern Europe*. New York: Colombia University Press.

• Ionesco, G. & Gellner, E. (1969), *Populism: its meaning and national characteristics*. New York: MacMillan.

• Jasper De Raadt & David Hollanders, Andre Kroowel, "Varieties of Populism", Papers of Political Science Dep., 2004/4, Universiteit Amsterdam.

• Kuzminski, Adrian (2008), *Fixing the System - A History of Populism*. London: International Publishing Group.

• Laclau, Ernesto (1977), *Capitalism-Fascism-Populism*. London: NLB.

• Laclau, Ernesto (1980), "Populist Rupture and Discourse", *Screen Education*, 34, Spring, 87-93.

• Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chatal (1985), *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.

• Laclau, Ernesto (2005), *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.

• Manoff, Marlene (2004), "Theories of the Archive", *Libraries and Academy*, 4(1), Johns Hopkins University Press: Maryland, 9-25.

• McGuigan, Jim (1992), *Cultural Pluralism*. London: Routledge.

• Meyer, Thomas (2002), *Media Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

• Moor, Margaret (2001), The Ethics of Nationalism. Offord: Oxford University Press.

• Panizza, Francisco (ed.) (2005), *Populism and Mirror of Democracy*. London: Verso.

• Postel, Charles (2009), *The Populist Vision*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Ricoeur P. (2004), *Memory, History, and Forgetting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

• Robert McKim, Jeff McMahan (ed.) (1997), The Morality of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Rorty , Richard (2007), *Philosophy as Cultural Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Salecl, Renata (1994), *The Spoils of Freedom*. London: Routledge.

- Sarat, Austin & Kearns, Thomas R. ed. (1999), *Cultural Pluralism Identity Politics and the Law*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

- Schmitt, Carl (1932, 1996), *The Concept of the Political*. Chicago: University of Chigago.

- Taggart, Paul A. (2000), *Populism*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

- Taquieff, P.A. (1995), *Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem*, Telos.

- Theodore Roszak (1967), *The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition*, University of California.

- Vosloo, R. (2005), *Archiving otherwise : some remarks on memory and historical responsibility*, Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae, Vol. XXXI, no. 2, October, 379-399.

- Žižek, Slavoj (1989), *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London.

- Žižek, Slavoj (2005), *O verovanju*. Zagreb: Algoritam.

- Žižek, Slavoj (2008), *O nasilju*. Zagreb: Ljevak.

- Žižek, Slavoj (2010), *Living in the End Times*. London: Verso.